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WHY SEXUAL PRIVACY MATTERS FOR 
TRUST 
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON* 
ABSTRACT 
Every generation has preferred modes of self-disclosure. Not long ago, 
lovers revealed their thoughts, desires, and secrets over the phone and in 
letters. Today, they exchange personal histories and nude photos via text 
and online chats. Yet no matter the era’s chosen mode of communication, 
the success of intimate relationships depends upon sexual privacy. Intimacy 
can develop only if partners trust each other to treat their self-revelations 
with discretion and care. 
Self-disclosure, however, is difficult after one’s nude photos have been 
posted online or one’s intimate encounters have been videotaped without 
permission. Individuals refrain from dating for fear that their intimate 
revelations will again be surveilled and exposed in unwanted ways. Sexual-
privacy invasions thus undermine the possibility of intimate relationships. 
Law should punish intimacy-destroying invasions of sexual privacy, and 
market efforts should be trained on their prevention and mitigation. Some 
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private responses, however, require a healthy dose of skepticism as they 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Jane Smith began dating after her divorce, she never imagined that 
her ex-husband would sneak into her house and hide a video camera in her 
bedroom.1 But that is precisely what he did.2 Smith’s ex had a copy of the 
key to her house in case one of their kids had an emergency.3 She never 
gave her ex permission to enter her bedroom, let alone to videotape her 
there.4 Her ex sent footage of Smith’s intimate activities with another man 
to her parents and members of her church. 
Much like Smith, we set boundaries around our intimate lives, and, much 
like Smith, we expect that those boundaries will be respected. We presume 
that no one is videotaping us in the bedroom unless invited to do so. And 
we assume that our sexually explicit photographs will not end up in family 
members’ inboxes without our say so. 
These sorts of social norms are essential building blocks of what I have 
called “sexual privacy.”5 Sexual privacy refers to the behaviors, 
expectations, and attitudes that mark the boundaries around intimate life. It 
concerns the ability to conceal the naked body and the seclusion afforded 
sexual intercourse and other intimate activities. It concerns the 
 




5. See Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870 (2019). 












confidentiality of thoughts, digital communications, and online searches 
about sex, sexuality, and gender. It concerns personal decisions about the 
revelation of our naked bodies and intimate information.6  
Sexual privacy should be recognized as a foundational privacy interest.7 
Sexual privacy is an essential precondition for sexual agency, self-
determination, and intimacy, and its denial risks entrenching the 
subordination of women and marginalized communities.8 It deserves special 
protection, much as do other crucial privacy interests like health privacy, 
financial privacy, communications privacy, children’s privacy, and 
intellectual privacy.9  
This Article explores a central reason for recognizing sexual privacy as 
a distinct privacy interest—its importance to intimacy. The protection of 
sexual privacy is essential for intimate relationships to thrive. Intimate 
relationships develop through a process of mutual self-disclosure and 
vulnerability.10 Self-revelation, however, is only possible when partners can 
be trusted to handle intimate information with care.11 Revealing intimate 
information is difficult after an ex-partner has been indiscreet with our 
confidences.12 As Smith told me, intimacy can seem unattainable, and trust 
foolhardy, after being secretly recorded in the bedroom and that recording 
exposed to family and friends.13  
Law should stand behind obligations of confidentiality assumed in 
intimate relationships. It should punish sexual-privacy invasions that sow 
distrust in the project of intimacy. Beyond law, private efforts should 
reinforce norms of sexual privacy. At the same time, we should be wary of 
market responses that over-promise and under-deliver for sexual privacy. 
This Article has three parts. Part I explores the connection between 
sexual privacy, intimacy, and trust. It highlights the centrality of sexual 
 
6. Id. at 1879–80. 
7. Id. at 1881. 
8. Id. at 1881–82. 
9. See WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 302–22, 731–883 (2016) 
(discussing cases and statutes providing special protection for children’s personal information collected 
online, health data, financial records, credit reports, electronic communications, and educational 
records); Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007) (arguing that 
certain personal information like biometric data and Social Security numbers pose acute risks of identity 
theft and other forms of fraud and warrant strict liability akin to ultrahazardous activities); Paul Ohm, 
Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1153–54 (2015) (including sex in a list of the kinds of  
information that count as sensitive). Neil Richards powerfully and convincingly contends that our 
intellectual activities deserve special recognition and protection. See NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL 
PRIVACY 95–108 (2015). 
10. See IRWIN ALTMAN & DALMAS TAYLOR, SOCIAL PENETRATION: THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS (1973). 
11. EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 125 (1978).  
12. CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 140 (1970). 













privacy to trust in intimate relationships. It distinguishes invocations of 
“privacy” that shield sexual-privacy invasions from accountability and 
undermine sexual autonomy, equality, and intimacy.  
As Part II explores, sexual-privacy invasions sow distrust. Victims find 
it difficult to forge new relationships after ex-intimates secretly record their 
naked bodies and exhibit their intimate information without consent. They 
feel unsafe in their bedrooms and in their relationships after strangers invade 
their sexual privacy. Part II lays out the costs to intimacy, emotional health, 
and professional life.  
Part III evaluates an encouraging development in privacy law—the 
growing scholarly emphasis on trust in relationships. It considers the 
potential role for trust in remedying and preventing sexual-privacy 
invasions. It also assesses market efforts that trend in this direction. It ends 
with a note of caution about private-sector developments that claim to 
protect sexual privacy and trust but may risk both. 
I. SEXUAL PRIVACY: AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION FOR TRUST IN 
INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 
This Part starts with a brief overview of sexual privacy’s significance to 
autonomy, identity, and equality. Then, it turns to the heart of the matter: 
sexual privacy’s importance to intimate relationships. It describes 
relationships that count as intimate and their importance for human 
flourishing. It shows how sexual privacy serves as an essential precondition 
to the development of intimate relationships. It argues that the coerced 
revelation or concealment of intimate life is the conceptual antithesis of 
sexual privacy. 
A. Sexual Privacy 
Managing the boundaries around our bodies, thoughts, activities, and 
personal information is a part of daily life.14 We cover genitals with clothing 
and leave hands bare. We share certain thoughts with long-term partners but 
not with coworkers.15 We keep some personal history to ourselves.16 At 
 
14. IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL SPACE, 
TERRITORY, AND CROWDING 50 (1975); Kirsty Hughes, A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and 
its Implications for Privacy Law, 75 MOD. L. REV. 806, 810–13 (2012). 
15. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 101–06 (2008) (offering a taxonomy of 
sixteen types of privacy problems, including intrusion, disclosure, collection, interrogation, use, 
anonymity, and invasion).  
16. Hugh Lazenby & Iason Gabriel, Permissible Secrets, 68 PHIL. Q. 265, 265–66 (2018). 












certain times, we close bedroom and bathroom doors, and we open them at 
other times.  
Whether privacy is warranted is determined by the settings, contexts, and 
expectations in which we set those boundaries.17 Crucial to those settings, 
contexts, and expectations is sex—the human body; intimate activities; 
personal information about sex, sexuality, and gender; and personal choices 
about the body and intimate activities.18  
I use the term “sexual privacy” to refer to the social norms that manage 
the boundaries around our intimate lives.19 Sexual privacy concerns the 
visibility of the naked body and the parts of the body closely associated with 
sex and gender.20 It involves the solitude afforded intimate activities, 
including but not limited to sex. It addresses the confidentiality of thoughts, 
communications, and online searches about sex, sexuality, and gender. It 
concerns decisions about the concealment of our sexual preferences, 
transgender status, or naked body.21 
Consider these illustrations of sexual privacy. A man takes off his 
clothing in a hotel room, expecting no hidden cameras there. A couple has 
sex in their bedroom, uninhibited in their interactions because they believe 
that they are alone. A woman reveals her childhood sexual assault to her 
lover, assuming that he will be discreet with that information. A man texts 
nude photographs to his boyfriend on the understanding that the photos are 
for their eyes only. A woman walks into a store, assuming that employees 
cannot see, let alone videotape her, up her skirt. 
The concept of sexual privacy has descriptive and normative 
dimensions.22 The term captures how sexual privacy is currently 
experienced and how it should be experienced.23 Sexual privacy, as I am 
using the term, secures “opportunities for . . . privacy and private choice” 
that individuals expect and deserve.24 Sometimes, law protects the 
boundaries that manage access to our bodies, intimate information, 
activities, and decisions.25 At other times, it provides little to no protection, 
though it should.26  
 
17. SOLOVE, supra note 15, at 44–46.  
18. PATRICIA BOLING, PRIVACY AND THE POLITICS OF INTIMATE LIFE 57 (1996). 
19. See Citron, supra note 5, at 1880. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 1880–81. 
23. Id. 
24. ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS 180 (1988). The scholarship of Linda McClain and Mary 
Anne Franks have also served as important inspiration for my thinking. 
25. Id. 
26. BOLING, supra note 18, at 57; FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND SOCIAL 













As I have argued, sexual privacy is crucial to sexual agency and self-
development.27 Individuals are free only insofar as they can determine the 
boundaries around their bodies and intimate lives. Sexual privacy allows 
people to decide whether their bodies are seen or taped; whether their 
thoughts, fantasies, and dreams are revealed; and whether their sexual 
preferences, gender, and sexual history are disclosed.28  
Being able to reveal one’s body in the way that one chooses is central to 
self-development.29 The human body serves as a “basic reference” for 
identity formation.30 It influences how people understand, develop, and 
construct gender identity and sexuality.31 Sexual privacy gives people 
freedom to experiment with their bodies, sexuality, and gender before 
revealing them to others.32 It gives them breathing room to explore sexual 
fantasies, thoughts, and wishes. It enables them to see themselves as the 
authors of their intimate lives, and it lets others see them as fully integrated 
human beings rather than as just intimate parts.33  
Equality is at stake as well. In the present, as in the past, women and 
marginalized communities shoulder the brunt of invasions of sexual 
privacy.34 In nineteenth-century America, enslaved individuals had no 
sexual privacy.35 Enslaved “black women were taken into the town square 
 
27. Citron, supra note 5, at 1902 (discussing David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 221, 222–24 (2016), which called for scholars to distinguish the value of different privacy 
interests so that policymakers can make meaningful decisions when privacy interests are in conflict). 
28. Citron, supra note 5, at 1880. 
29. Id. at 1883. 
30. See MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION (2013); Tom 
Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 233, 266 (1977). The body can be a source of 
empowerment, but it also can be a source of deep anxiety when it does not match one’s experience of 
gender. Janet Mock writes movingly about how her genitals taunted her—she felt like a girl from a 
tender age and her genitals served as a rebuke to that feeling. JANET MOCK, REDEFINING REALNESS: MY 
PATH TO WOMANHOOD, IDENTITY, LOVE & SO MUCH MORE (2014).  
31. We perform and construct gender identity; gender identity is not fixed or static. Paulan 
Korenhof & Bert-Jaap Koops, Gender Identity and Privacy: Could a Right to Be Forgotten Help Andrew 
Agnes Online? 3–5 (Tilburg Inst. for Law, Tech. & Soc’y, Working Paper No. 3/2013, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2304190. Our gender identity may not match how 
culture perceives our bodies. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 7 (1990) (explaining that culture and 
norms link some parts of our bodies—genitalia, female breasts, and buttocks—to our person in a way 
that other body parts are not); see Amy Kapczynski, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1273–77 (2003) (exploring treatment of genitalia and 
“states of undress” as matter of culture, threat, and risk).  
32. See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 
(1963); FRIED, supra note 12, at 140. 
33. See, e.g., MOCK, supra note 30; JENNIFER FINNEY BOYLAN, SHE’S NOT THERE: A LIFE IN 
TWO GENDERS (2003); Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the 
Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 241 (1995). 
34. Scott Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double Standards, 93 WASH. L. REV. 2051, 2055 (2018) 
(explaining that marginalized communities are disproportionately subject to unwanted surveillance); 
Scott Skinner-Thompson, Performative Privacy, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1673, 1678 (2017). 
35. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY 10 (1997). 












to be sold. They were paraded around naked, to be inspected and critiqued 
for future sale and sure abuse.”36 Their bodies were treated as “items of 
public (indeed pornographic) display.”37 White masters sexually assaulted 
enslaved women and forced them to bear their children.38 The situation was 
hardly better for free black women.39 Black men and women, enslaved and 
free, were denied sexual privacy because they were deemed unworthy of 
it.40  
Conceptions of womanhood that led to the public exposure of black 
women’s bodies41 led to the control of upper- and middle-class white 
women in the “family home” where they enjoyed little sexual privacy.42 
Upper- and middle-class white women had few opportunities to enjoy 
solitude and repose in the home.43 As John Stuart Mill observed, husbands 
colonized wives’ sentiments and bodies.44  
In the twentieth century, workplace sexual harassment was rampant. 
Until the late 1970s, it was acceptable to gawk at, ogle, and touch women 
in the workplace.45 Sexual harassment was viewed as a perk of men’s 
employment rather than as invidious discrimination.46 In the wake of Anita 
Hill’s testimony at the Clarence Thomas hearings in 1991, African 
American women called attention to society’s refusal to address racist and 
 
36. Abigail Pesta, Gabrielle Union: “My Nude Photos Were Stolen, and I’m Fighting Back”, 
COSMOPOLITAN (Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.cosmopolitan.com/entertainment/celebs/news/a32589/ga 
brielle-union-my-nude-photos-were-stolen/ [https://perma.cc/VM2W-DGJL]. 
37. Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy, 40 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 770 (1999) (citing PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: 
KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 163–80 (1991)). 
38. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 25–27 (1981). 
39. MARY M. BROWNLEE & W. ELLIOTT BROWNLEE, WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1675 TO 1929 244 (1976). Gerda Lerner notes that the “free availability [of 
black women] as sex objects to any white man was enshrined in tradition, upheld by the laws forbidding 
inter-marriage, enforced by terror against black men and women and . . . tolerated both in its clandestine 
and open manifestations.” GERDA LERNER, BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 149–50 (1973). 
40. ROBERTS, supra note 35, at 10. Black women were “exiled from the norms of true 
womanhood.” Id. In the post-slavery era, black women in the segregated South remained “hypervisible 
and on display.” SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS 57 (2015). 
Black women working as domestic laborers in white-controlled private homes were subject to various 
techniques of surveillance, including close scrutiny, sexual harassment, assault, and violence. PATRICIA 
HILL COLLINS, FIGHTING WORDS: BLACK WOMEN AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE (1998). 
41. McClain, supra note 37, at 770; see also TONI MORRISON, RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-
GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL 
REALITY (1992). 
42. ALLEN, supra note 24, at 54–56. 
43. Id. 
44. JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 26–27 (2d ed. 1869). 
45. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 96–98 (2014). 
46. Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 













sexist workplace harassment, a legacy of the long-standing trivialization of 
black women’s sexual abuse.47  
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, sexual minorities 
were denied the ability to draw boundaries around their intimate affairs. 
State sodomy laws effectively criminalized their intimate interactions.48 
Until the Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas,49 the fear of state 
intrusion hung over intimate interactions of LGBT individuals. As Anita 
Allen explains, restroom stalls and bedrooms were “not reliably private for 
the LGBT community.”50  
In the twenty-first century, women and marginalized communities have 
continued to be disproportionately targeted with invasions of sexual 
privacy. They suffer acute stigmatization when their nude photos or sexual 
activities are exposed online.51 They lose jobs and have difficulty finding 
new ones.52 They feel humiliated and ashamed.53 Invasions of sexual 
privacy make it difficult to enjoy all of life’s crucial opportunities.54 
B. Intimacy & Trust 
Sexual privacy enables the development of intimate relationships whose 
societal importance is undeniable. As philosophers, psychologists, legal 
scholars, and religious thinkers agree, intimate relationships are central to 
human existence.55 Through intimate relationships, people come to know 
 
47. “African American Women in Defense of Ourselves” (1991), in DOCUMENTING INTIMATE 
MATTERS: PRIMARY SOURCES FOR A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 200, 201 (Thomas A. Foster 
ed., 2013). 
48. See JOEY J. MOGUL, ANDREA J. RITCHIE & KAY WHITLOCK, QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 11–16 (2011); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186 (1986). 
49. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
50. Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT Plaintiffs, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
1711, 1721 (2010). 
51. CITRON, supra note 45, at 6–7. 
52. Id. at 6.  
53. See, e.g., ‘I Couldn’t Talk or Sleep for Three Days’: Journalist Rana Ayyub’s Horrific Social 
Media Ordeal over Fake Tweet, MSN (Apr. 28, 2018), https://www.msn.com/en-
in/news/newsindia/%E2%80%98i-couldn%E2%80%99t-talk-or-sleep-for-three-days%E2%80%99-
journalist-rana-ayyub%E2%80%99s-horrific-social-media-ordeal-over-fake-tweet/ar-AAwnGHv 
[https://perma.cc/M9G2-N9C6]; TEDx Talks, Sexual Predators Edited My Photos into Porn—How I 
Fought Back | Noelle Martin | TEXxPerth, YOUTUBE (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=PctUS31px40 [https://perma.cc/44EX-BAYH]. 
54. See CITRON, supra note 45. 
55. BOLING, supra note 18, at 67, 102; Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, Female 
Human Beings, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 61 
(Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995); JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND 
ISOLATION 88–90 (1992); HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 51, 73 (1958); Jeffrey H. Reiman, 
Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 31 (1976). 












themselves, their partners, and humanity.56 Intimate relationships inform 
“our notion of ourselves as persons among persons.”57 They provide 
emotional sustenance, which in turn enables civic and political 
engagement.58  
Philosopher Martin Buber argued that intimate relationships allow 
people to experience meaning and to glimpse the divine.59 He described 
intimacy in this way: “Only he who himself turns to the other human being 
and opens himself to him receives the world in him. Only the being whose 
otherness, accepted by my being, lives and faces me in the whole 
compression of existence, brings the radiance of eternity to me.”60 
That is not to dismiss the importance of a wide variety of non-intimate 
relationships. For instance, people hold dear their relationships with doctors, 
therapists, lawyers, and financial advisers.61 In professional relationships, 
personal information tends to flow in one direction—from individuals to 
expert advisers—as does the expectation of trust.62 OBGYNs know highly 
sensitive personal information about their patients, but patients know 
comparatively little about them.63 Lawyers learn everything they can about 
their clients’ troubles, but their clients know little about theirs. Financial 
advisers study their clients’ income and assets, but their clients are not privy 
to theirs. Professionals are expected to protect the confidentiality of that 
personal information.64 
In intimate relationships, the information flow is not one-sided. To the 
contrary—a defining feature of intimate relationships is mutual 
knowledge.65 Intimate relationships emerge from a “relational process in 
which we come to know the innermost, subjective aspects of another, and 
 
56. ERICH FROMM, THE ART OF LOVING 47 (1957). When people share innermost thoughts, 
values, and attitudes—what Fromm called the core of themselves, they perceive their “identity, the fact 
of [their] brotherhood.” Id. 
57. FRIED, supra note 12, at 137, 140. 
58. ARENDT, supra note 55, at 51, 73. Arendt warns against a sole focus on familial, intimate 
relationships to the exclusion of the collective good. Id. at 68–73. Burrowing into private life to the 
exclusion of the public led to the mindless execution of Hitler’s Final solution. Id. 
59. MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (WITH PROLOGUE AND NOTES BY WALTER KAUFMAN) 
151 (1970 Trans.); MARTIN BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN 30–31, 204–05 (1947). 
60. BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN, supra note 59, at 30. 
61. See Reiman, supra note 55, at 33. 
62. See, e.g., id. 
63. This is obvious from the exemplary work of Dr. Jeanine Morris-Rush and her partner Melissa 
Oppenheim in Preferred Women’s Health.  
64. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 174 (2007). 
65. John G. Holmes & John K. Rempel, Trust in Close Relationships, in CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 
187, 190 (Clyde Hendrick ed., 1989); see also INNESS, supra note 55, at 88–90 (describing intimacy as 
acts or matters that “draw value and meaning” from an agent’s “love, caring, or liking” and formed in 













are known in a like manner.”66 In addition to mutual knowledge, intimate 
partners have strong feelings of care and affection for one another.67 They 
have a shared sense of mutuality (that they are engaged in a joint enterprise), 
interdependence (that they can depend upon one another for support), and 
commitment (that they want the relationship to continue).68 They see 
themselves as an “‘us’—a new system with its own unique properties.”69  
Mutual trust is a crucial feature of intimate relationships. Intimate 
partners engage in reciprocal self-disclosure because they “trust . . . that no 
undue harm will be associated with the relationship.”70 Trust grows from 
the belief that partners will treat one another’s personal information as they 
hope rather than as they fear.71 Intimate partners reveal their innermost 
thoughts, feelings, and experiences because they believe that the other 
person will be discreet with their information.72 The “increased 
vulnerability which arises with intimacy is tolerable only if accompanied by 
the belief that the partner will not exploit it.”73 In intimate relationships, 
personal information flows in both directions as does the expectation of 
discretion. 
Social psychologists Irwin Altman and Dalman Taylor highlight the 
importance of privacy to trust in intimate relationships.74 As Altman and 
Taylor explain, intimate relationships develop through a social process.75 At 
first, individuals tend to meet in public spaces and exchange favorable 
“nonintimate information” about themselves.76 Over time, intimates reveal 
 
66. Gordon J. Chelune, Joan T. Robison & Martin J. Kommor, A Cognitive Interactional Model 
of Intimate Relationships, in COMMUNICATION, INTIMACY, AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 11, 14 
(Valerian J. Derlega ed., 1984) (emphasis omitted). 
67. Id. at 33. 
68. Id. at 29–32. 
69. Id. at 26. 
70. Id. at 31. Social science accounts of intimate relationships mirror philosophical work. For 
instance, the cognitive interactive model of intimate relationships of Chelune and his coauthors is 
familiar to readers of Erich Fromm, whose theory of love is premised on knowledge, care, responsibility, 
and respect. FROMM, supra note 56, at 26–33. 
71. Holmes & Rempel, supra note 65, at 187, 190. 
72. Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 431, 453 (2016). 
73. Chelune et al., supra note 66, at 31 (quoting R.A. HINDE, PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 14 
(VOL. 1). Of course, trust is crucial for all sorts of relationships. Helen Nissenbaum, Securing Trust 
Online: Wisdom or Oxymoron?, 81 B.U. L. REV. 635, 639–44 (2001). There is a rich literature on the 
role of trust in various relationships and contexts. See, e.g., NIKLAS LUHMANN, Defining the Problem: 
Social Complexity, in TRUST AND POWER: TWO WORKS 8 (1979); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: 
THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 7 (1995); Russell Hardin, 
Trustworthiness, 107 ETHICS 26, 33 (1996). Boston University Law Review put together a superb issue 
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321 (2001). 
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more personal information to one another in public and private settings.77 
This is what Altman and Taylor called the “social penetration process.”78 
At the heart of the “social penetration process” is the exchange of 
“vulnerable, socially undesirable facets of the self.”79 People are forthright 
about their desires and secrets if partners are forthright about theirs.80 They 
reveal painful past experiences if their partners tell them about theirs.81 
Reciprocal vulnerability generates “trust and a growing confidence that 
intimates will not hurt each other intentionally.”82  
Intimacy thus depends upon partners treating one another’s personal 
information with care.83 Lovers “lay bare their innermost feelings to each 
other, they are lewd and foolish with each other, they stand naked before 
each other” on the premise that “what is shared so intimately will not be 
broadcast to the world at large.”84 People reveal their intimate selves on the 
assumption that their partners will not treat them as “inconsequential.”85 
They do not hide or self-censor unappealing personal facts because they 
believe their partners will be discreet with the information.86  
Sexual privacy is crucial to the “success and integrity” of intimate 
relationships.87 It enables partners to know one another and to be known to 
one another. Revealing one’s history with sexual assault is difficult, but it 
is unthinkable if one’s partner cannot be trusted to handle that information 
with care.  
With sexual privacy, intimate partners feel free to engage in sexual 
expression, which opens them up to new experiences.88 They engage in 
physical intimacy without concern that others are watching and judging 
them. They are spontaneous in their interactions.89 They “lose [their] 
 
77. Id. at 139, 150.  
78. See id. at 52–55, 136–39, 150, 169–72 (describing the stages of the social penetration 
process). 
79. Id. at 136–39. 
80. Id. at 199. 
81. BLOUSTEIN, supra note 11, at 181. 
82. ALTMAN & TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 77. 
83. BLOUSTEIN, supra note 11, at 125–26. 
84. Id. at 125. 
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OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 406 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984). 
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Processes, 75 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 79 (1968). 
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inhibitions and expose [them]selves to one another.”90 Sexual privacy lets 
partners “be what they truly are—at least as bodies—intensely and 
together.”91 In these and other ways, privacy serves as a precondition for 
achieving intimacy.92 
A few caveats are in order. I am not suggesting that sexual privacy’s 
absence makes intimacy impossible. Consider prison life.93 Incarcerated 
individuals do forge intimate relationships though they are under constant 
scrutiny. Yet constant surveillance undeniably impedes intimacy. Indeed, 
the denial of sexual privacy constitutes an aspect of the state’s punishment.94  
Nor am I saying that sexual relationships inevitably involve intimate 
relationships. Casual hook-ups do not entail the sort of mutual knowledge, 
caring, interdependence, and trust characteristic of intimate relationships. 
Nonetheless, they warrant sexual privacy because of their centrality to 
autonomy and self-development. Intimacy is not part of the calculus.95  
Also, I am not suggesting that seclusion and confidentiality inevitably 
enhance intimacy. Not at all. The powerful have long abused the powerless 
from behind closed doors. Physical spaces have hidden privacy-invading 
sexual harassment and sexual assault. Television show host Matt Lauer had 
a button installed at his desk so he could lock his office door when female 
staffers entered.96 According to reports, the button “afforded him the 
assurance of privacy. It allowed him to welcome female employees and 
initiate inappropriate contact while knowing nobody could walk in on him, 
according to two women who were sexually harassed by Lauer.”97  
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Using Grindr, 17 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1117 (2015). Thanks to symposium co-organizer Ari Waldman 
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Movie mogul Harvey Weinstein had employees guard his hotel rooms 
and offices from entry except actresses whose sexual privacy he invaded 
and whose bodies he assaulted.98 Female employees were told to go to the 
hotel rooms of television personality Charlie Rose—there, he exposed his 
genitals and demanded sex.99 Comedian Louis C.K. masturbated in front of 
shocked and scared female comedians behind locked doors.100 Sexual 
harassers have obtained confidentiality agreements that shield their abuse 
from public reckoning.101  
The invocation of “privacy” to undermine sexual privacy has a long 
legacy. Law protected batterers’ interest in privacy without considering 
battered wives’ privacy interests.102 Society’s treatment of the home as a 
secluded domain where men could abuse their wives without state 
intervention is part of this phenomenon.103 Late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth- century courts invoked the concept of the “private sphere” to 
justify concealing spousal abuse from any accountability.104 Law recognized 
the privacy interests of male batterers while ignoring the privacy interests 
of battered women.105 In the home, battered women had scant opportunities 
for sexual privacy.106 They had few moments of solitude and little sexual 
autonomy.107 
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Sexual privacy should not be abandoned for fear of the possibility that 
“privacy” can be invoked in service of its invasion. It should not be rejected 
because privacy has previously been coopted to hide abuse and to coerce 
silence.108 As Anita Allen has powerfully explained, while “the traditional 
predicament was . . . too much of the wrong kind of privacy,” subordinated 
individuals deserved “privacy in the sense of adequate opportunities for 
privacy and private choice.”109  
Sexual privacy deserves recognition and protection when it protects 
autonomy, fosters intimacy, and secures equality for all involved.110 
Properly understood, sexual privacy frees people to set boundaries around 
their intimate lives.111 It allows them to decide who has access to their naked 
bodies, intimate information, and sexual desires. With sexual privacy, 
people can determine if their sexually explicit images are shared with others. 
They can reveal their transgender identity and bisexuality at their own time, 
in their own way, and under their own conditions. Sexual privacy protects 
individuals from being watched, exhibited, and shamed for their naked 
bodies, sexual preferences, gender identity, and intimate selves.112  
II. SOWING DISTRUST  
This Part highlights how sexual-privacy invasions undermine trust 
necessary for intimacy. Section A provides illustrations of perpetrators who 
invade the sexual privacy of former intimates. Section B gives examples of 
perpetrators who target non-intimates. Section C discusses the individual 
and societal harm inflicted.  
A. Betraying the Trust of Intimate Partners 
Sexual-privacy invaders betray intimate partners’ trust in various ways. 
Perpetrators, for instance, secretly photograph and videotape intimate 
 
108. Feminist scholars have viewed the invocation of “privacy” in the service of subordination as 
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partners undressing or having sex.113 They give gifts with hidden cameras 
so they can spy on their partners in the bedroom and bathroom.114  
Consider the case of New York financial adviser John Kelly who used a 
“doggy cam” in his bedroom to secretly tape his sexual liaisons with 
romantic partners.115 He brought his laptop to women’s homes and hid a 
camera in his bedroom in order to tape their sexual encounters.116 The 
videos captured him setting up the camera and angling it to focus on the 
bed.117 Kelly showed some of the secret sex videos to a friend. Although 
charged with several felonies, Kelly plead guilty to a single misdemeanor. 
He was sentenced to ten days of community service and no prison time.118  
People invade sexual privacy by distributing their intimate partners’ 
sexually graphic images without consent, a practice called nonconsensual 
pornography.119 Alexandra Waterbury experienced a double betrayal of 
trust in 2018: her boyfriend secretly made recordings of her naked body and 
showed them to colleagues.120 When Waterbury was a student at the 
American Ballet School, she dated Chase Finlay, a principal dancer with the 
New York City Ballet (NYCB).121 Over a year’s time, Finlay took nude and 
sexually explicit photographs and videos of her without permission.122 He 
texted the photos and videos to two colleagues and a ballet donor.123 In a 
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similar case, Carlo Dellverson secretly videotaped his sexual encounters 
with his girlfriend and posted the videos to a porn site.124 In 2015, a judge 
sentenced him to community service and court-ordered therapy.125  
Some individuals obtain their intimate partners’ nude images with 
consent and betray their partners’ trust by distributing the images without 
consent.126 In 2009, Holly Jacobs shared sexually-explicit images and 
videos with her boyfriend.127 The images were meant for their eyes only.128 
After their relationship ended, her ex betrayed her trust and posted the 
photos and videos on hundreds of revenge porn sites, porn sites, and adult 
finder sites.129 Her nude photos were sent to her boss.130  
Law enforcement initially refused to help Jacobs, incorrectly claiming 
that harassment was a “civil” matter in her state.131 At the urging of her 
Senator’s office, the state attorney’s office took up the case, charging her ex 
with misdemeanor harassment.132 Nonetheless, the charges were dropped 
after her ex claimed that he had been hacked.133 Prosecutors said that they 
could not justify obtaining a warrant to investigate a misdemeanor.134 The 
abuse was not serious enough to expend investigative resources.135 
College student Kathryn Novak had a long-distance relationship with 
Brandon Simpson who attended a university in another state.136 Novak and 
Simpson visited one another a few times a month. During the relationship, 
Simpson asked Novak to send him intimate images and videos. Novak did 
so on the explicit understanding that the photos and videos would be kept 
private and confidential.137 She never told Simpson that he could share the 
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images with anyone else.138 Simpson violated Novak’s trust along several 
dimensions. He posted her nude photos on his fraternity’s private Facebook 
page, secretly videotaped their sexual encounters, and showed the sex 
videos to members of his fraternity.139  
These practices undermine sexual privacy by denying individuals’ 
agency over their intimate lives. They hijack victims’ ability to decide who 
has access to their bodies, bedrooms, or nude images. They betray victims’ 
trust by treating them as sex objects warranting exhibition and mockery 
rather than as partners deserving respect and confidentiality. They make it 
hard for victims to entrust their bodies and intimate information to others in 
the future. 
B. Corroding the Project of Intimacy with Sexual-Privacy Invasions 
What about sexual-privacy invasions that do not involve a betrayal of 
trust? Privacy invaders target strangers, tenants, co-workers, and other non-
intimates. These privacy invasions damage the project of intimacy by 
undermining victims’ sense of safety and ability to trust others in the 
future.140 This Section provides several illustrations.  
Consider the experience of renowned sports reporter Erin Andrews. A 
man who Andrews did not know booked a hotel room next to the room she 
occupied.141 He altered the peephole of her hotel door so he could film her 
as she undressed. The man later posted online the videos of her 
undressing.142 After the release of the videos, much of the nation began 
looking for some variation on “Erin Andrews peephole video.”143 The man 
was sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison.144 
Sextortion—extortion or blackmail involving a threat to release sexually 
explicit images of the victim if the victim does not engage in further sexual 
activity—is another sexual-privacy invasion involving perpetrators who 
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tend to target non-intimates.145 Luis Mijangos tricked hundreds of women 
and teenage girls into downloading malware onto their computers.146 He 
turned on victims’ webcams to record them undressing. Once Mijangos 
obtained their nude images, he threatened to post their nude photos unless 
they complied with his demands. He coerced 230 women and girls into 
performing sex acts for him on camera and sending him nude images.147 
Michael Ford hacked into the computers of hundreds of women to obtain 
sexually explicit images.148 Ford sent the women emails in which he 
threatened to disclose their nude images unless they sent him videos of 
“‘sexy girls’ undressing in changing rooms at pools, gyms and clothing 
stores.”149 He escalated his threats when victims refused his demands. Ford 
told one victim that he would post her contact information and photographs 
on an “escort/hooker website.” In a few cases, he made good on the threats 
and sent the victims’ nude photos to their family members and friends.150 
Ford was sentenced to fifty-seven months in prison.151  
These practices eliminate victims’ autonomy over intimate activities and 
spaces. Perpetrators take control over victims’ bodies, instructing them to 
commit sexually degrading acts and to exhibit their genitalia on videocam. 
They interfere with their ability to retreat in safety to their bedrooms. These 
practices say to individuals that their intimate spaces are not safe from 
prying eyes. Although perpetrators have no prior relationship with victims, 
their torment makes it difficult for victims to trust intimates in the future. 
They suggest that any intimate activity risks invasions of sexual privacy. 
 
145. BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., SEXTORTION: CYBERSECURITY, TEENAGERS AND REMOTE 
SEXUAL ASSAULT 2 (May 11, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/sextortion-cybersecurity-teen 
agers-and-remote-sexual-assault/. The scheme begins when perpetrators obtain victims’ nude images 
either by tricking them into sharing them or by theft, such as hacking into their computers. Id. 
Perpetrators threaten to distribute the nude photos unless victims send more nude photos or perform 
degrading sex acts in front of webcams. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Sara Ashley O’Brien, Sextortion is Scarily Common, New Study Finds, CNN TECH (May 11, 
2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/05/11/technology/brookings-institution-sextortion-study/ [https:// 
perma.cc/6QVP-6SS2]; Adam Duvernay, NY Man Gets 16 Years for ‘Sextortion’ of Sexual Images from 
Child in Delaware, NEWS J. (May 30, 2018, 9:36 AM), https://www.lavozarizona.com/story/news/ 
crime/2018/05/30/ny-man-gets-16-years-coercing-sexual-images-de-child/655772002/ [https://perma 
.cc/693W-VXN6].  
148. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former U.S. State Department Employee Sentenced to 



















For victims, the psychological damage can be profound. Victims suffer 
anxiety and fear.152 They describe feeling helpless.153 Waterbury explained 
that she could not eat or sleep when she first found out about Finlay’s 
betrayal of her trust.154 Her initial “shock and denial” turned into “anger and 
embarrassment.”155 She was “depressed” and “overwhelmed.”156 She put 
her life on hold and was hospitalized.157 Waterbury explained that her “body 
was violated, taken advantage of . . . I had no control over any of this. And 
for these men to think that they could take that away and ruin that and 
degrade me, everything that I am, was disgusting.”158 
Victims have difficulty putting the abuse behind them. Years after a 
stalker secretly recorded her undressing and posted the videos online, 
Andrews still felt terrified.159 A victim of sextortion has explained that the 
perpetrator “haunts me every time I use the computer.”160  
Feelings of distrust are hard to dislodge after one’s sexual privacy has 
been invaded.161 Vulnerability is “painful, and trust difficult to sustain in an 
inhospitable and uncertain universe.”162 We saw this in Andrews’s case. The 
stalker’s privacy invasions made it difficult for Andrews to trust then-
boyfriend Jarret Stoll. Andrews explained: “[Stoll] didn’t know me before 
this happened [so it was hard to] try to explain to someone who has 
questions about why I have trust issues, why I am insecure, why I am 
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People who experience betrayal in intimate relationships tend to adopt a 
“risk aversive strategy” in future ones.164 They interpret the actions of others 
negatively, impacting their ability to forge intimate relationships.165 After a 
woman discovered that her ex’s gifts contained recording devices, she had 
“recurrent and intrusive thoughts of being exposed and violated, 
interference with her personal relationships, [and] feelings of vulnerability 
and mistrust.”166 She explained that “[s]he lives in a perpetual state of fear 
that someone is watching or spying on her and she does not feel safe 
anywhere.”167 
In my interviews with people whose partners invaded their sexual 
privacy, this point was made time and again.168 Jacobs was afraid to date for 
months after discovering that her ex posted her nude images all over the 
internet.169 Smith talked to me about her feelings of distrust after her ex-
husband secretly taped her being intimate with a new partner and shared the 
video with her parents and members of her church.170 She has not gotten 
serious with anyone since that time and cannot imagine letting down her 
guard with anyone else.171 She swears that she will never get married 
again.172  
The societal costs are undeniable. Sexual-privacy invasions undermine 
the development of relationships that are central to human flourishing. 
When victims withdraw from daily activities in the aftermath of sexual-
privacy invasions, the public is denied their artistic, scholarly, and civic 
contributions. Waterbury, for instance, stopped dancing for an extended 
period of time after she discovered Finlay’s invasion of her sexual privacy. 
As my work has explored elsewhere, because women and minorities are 
more often targeted, sexual-privacy invasions entrench subordination and 
marginalization. 
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III. ASSESSING THE TURN TO TRUST  
This Part considers the turn to trust in the law and marketplace. It 
explores trust-based legal principles that can be leveraged to protect sexual 
privacy. At the same time, it recognizes the shortcomings of a trust-based 
legal approach. This Part then considers private-sector developments. It 
assesses a recent market trend—the consent app—and its implications for 
sexual privacy. Although supporters emphasize the app’s potential to secure 
sexual agency and trust, the reverse is more likely.  
A. Enforcing Legal Commitments of Trust 
From its earliest days, legal scholarship has focused on the importance 
of privacy for intimate relationships. In their landmark article The Right to 
Privacy, published in 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis criticized 
journalists for “spying” on the family home.173 They objected to “daily 
papers” that revealed “details of sexual relations” and family members’ 
correspondence.174 They warned that when intimacies “whispered in the 
closet” are “proclaimed from the house-tops,” individuals and society 
suffer.175 In their view, the nonconsensual revelation of the “fact” of a 
“domestic occurrence” risked “spiritual” harm even greater than “material” 
harm.176  
Warren and Brandeis argued in favor of tort law’s recognition of a “right 
‘to be let alone’” in the “sacred precincts of private and domestic life.”177 In 
their view, individuals should control what others know about their 
“domestic circle.”178 Crucial was the ability to determine “to what extent 
[one’s] thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to 
others.”179 Although the legal literature does not often emphasize this point, 
Warren and Brandeis constructed the right to privacy out of concern for the 
development of intimate relationships. 
Over time, and under the influence of torts scholar William Prosser, 
courts heeded the call for privacy torts.180 Privacy tort law now provides 
redress for intrusions on seclusion, public disclosures of private facts, 
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depictions in false light, and misappropriation of one’s identity (often for 
commercial purposes).181 It has not evolved beyond these four claims.182 
Concepts of confidentiality have not been integrated into the privacy torts, 
a missed opportunity that should be seized.183 
Contemporary privacy scholarship has highlighted privacy law’s 
potential to protect trust in information relationships.184 In a series of 
articles, Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog argue that privacy law’s next 
stage of development should focus on trust.185 Taking trust seriously would 
result in people sharing more information, resulting in more “sustainable, 
profitable relationships” with public and private entities.186 Under Ari 
Waldman’s theory of “privacy as trust,” privacy protects, fosters, and 
repairs trust essential for information sharing among individuals and 
between individuals and companies.187  
Drawing upon legal developments in the United Kingdom, Neil Richards 
and Daniel Solove call for privacy tort law to recognize breach of 
confidence claims.188 They point to the common law’s protection of the 
exchange of information in professional relationships.189 As Richards and 
Solove propose, liability would hinge upon the nature of the relationship 
between the parties and the norms governing the handling of such personal 
information.190  
A breach of confidence tort would be useful in protecting sexual privacy 
in the array of contexts where the privacy torts provide no protection.191 
Cramped notions of privacy have left some invasions of sexual privacy 
without legal protection. Traditional privacy law fails to address certain 
sexual-privacy invasions due to its reliance on “underinclusive bright line 
rules to determine the difference between public and private.”192  
Consider the tort of public disclosure of private fact. To make out a 
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wide audience.193 In Bilbrey v. Myers,194 a pastor announced at a church 
service that the plaintiff was gay. Plaintiff’s family members, including his 
fiancée’s father, were in the audience.195 The court struck down the public 
disclosure of private fact claim because the defendant did not convey the 
information to the public at large.196 This presumes that when intimate 
information is disclosed to a small group of people, there is little damage 
suffered. But it is often precisely those small groups of people—employers, 
family, and colleagues—to whom disclosure is most damaging.197  
Let’s return to Waterbury’s case. She was devastated to learn that her ex-
boyfriend had sent her sexually explicit photos and videos to NYCB 
principal dancers who also were her former ballet teachers. Because her ex 
never revealed the photos and videos to the public at large, the disclosure 
tort, as currently interpreted in the majority of jurisdictions, would have no 
application.198 Kelly’s victims faced the same problem—he allegedly only 
showed his former girlfriends’ sex videos to one other person. The public 
disclosure tort would not apply to Jacobs’s ex-boyfriend’s emailing her 
nude photos to her employer or to Simpson’s showing of the sex tape to his 
fraternity brothers. In these cases, if a breach of confidence tort were 
recognized, it would provide the possibility of redress because the 
perpetrators shared the nude images in violation of intimate partners’ 
trust.199 
Building on trust concepts to develop privacy tort law would be valuable. 
Breach of confidence claims would redress harm, to be sure. But it also 
would have an important expressive function. Law is our teacher and 
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guide.200 It shapes attitudes, beliefs, and behavior through its messages and 
lessons.201 It tells us what behavior is harmful and wrongful.202 Legal 
penalties demonstrate societal intensity around a social value.203  
Besides signaling how people should act by highlighting the social costs 
of conduct, law provides a “focal point” around which individuals can 
organize their behavior.204 When public sentiment about specific behavior 
is unclear, law provides expressive clarity, channeling shifts in beliefs, 
attitudes, and behaviors.205 
Breach of confidence claims would send the message that confidentiality 
in intimate relationships matter. They would say that breaches of trust 
damage individuals and undermine relationships essential for social 
cohesion. Potential perpetrators would have a choice: to respect the 
boundaries that intimates set around their bodies or to provide redress for 
wrongful breaches of confidence.  
Breach of trust claims would reinforce obligations of confidentiality in 
intimate relationships. Individuals would come to see themselves as 
stewards of their partners’ intimate information. They would recognize that 
partners’ confidences related to sex, sexuality, and gender warrant 
discretion and care.206 Breach of trust claims would say society values the 
trust that intimate partners place in one another. They would make clear that 
partners are not being foolish if they engage in reciprocal disclosure of their 
bodies, sexual fantasies, and intimate experiences.  
Yet breach of confidence claims would not address all invasions of 
sexual privacy. They would not apply to sexual privacy invaders who do not 
have pre-existing relationships with victims. It would not apply to 
Andrews’s stalker. Nor to Mijangos or Ford, who invaded the sexual 
privacy of hundreds of strangers.  
A question worth asking is whether importing trust concepts into privacy 
law would cause unanticipated problems? Nearly twenty years ago, Larry 
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Ribstein raised concerns about laws enforcing trust in contexts where parties 
enter into those relationships voluntarily without any legal protection of 
trust.207 In such contexts, policymakers and courts should consider law’s 
potential unintended negative consequences.208 After all, as Ribstein 
explained, there was no need for law to encourage the parties to enter into 
the relationship in the first place.  
Would breach of trust claims do more harm than good in the context of 
intimate relationships? To be sure, Americans forge intimate partnerships 
without the benefit of breach of confidence protections. But, as we have 
seen, contemporary sexual-privacy invasions jeopardize this state of affairs. 
They corrode the very project of intimacy by shaking victims’ confidence 
that future partners can be trusted. They also occur at a time of significant 
peril. Not only are sexual-privacy invasions easier to accomplish in the 
digital age, but they are exponentially more damaging than sexual-privacy 
invasions in the analog age.209  
Breach of confidentiality claims would have an upside with little evident 
downside. It would redress breaches of confidence in contexts where parties 
have developed mutual knowledge, interdependence, love, respect, and 
trust, and where that trust has been betrayed. It would express society’s view 
that trust is valuable and worth protecting in intimate relationships.  
Law should redress and deter invasions of sexual privacy involving 
betrayals of trust, as in the case of Jacobs’s ex-boyfriend. It should intervene 
in cases where individuals like Kelly, Finlay, and Simpson violate a shared 
understanding that intimate information would not be shared outside the 
relationship.  
Law can prevent concerns about over-deterrence by cabining the 
definition of what is considered a protected intimate relationship. The 
shared characteristics of intimate relationships explored above provide a 
helpful start. With clear and narrow definitions, people would be far less 
likely to be chilled from sharing information obtained in ordinary 
interactions.  
Although this approach would be fruitful, we must recognize the 
limitations of tort redress. Victims need resources to sue defendants.210 It is 
hard to justify spending scarce resources if defendants are essentially 
judgment proof.211 Litigation invites invasive discovery, and victims may 
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not want to reveal their medical history or to sit for a deposition across from 
their tormentors.212  
 If civil suits are not pursued, then criminal law should be invoked to 
deter sexual-privacy invasions. Warren and Brandeis recognized criminal 
law’s potential and urged lawmakers to consider criminalizing invasions of 
privacy.213 Today, criminal law addresses certain sexual-privacy invasions, 
but, as the cases discussed above show, it has hardly fulfilled its potential 
to deter invasions of sexual privacy.214 Law enforcement lacks sufficient 
training in the law and technology, ending investigations before they even 
begin.215 Criminal law treats many sexual-privacy invasions as 
misdemeanors.216 Perpetrators then receive light sentences. Recall Kelly’s 
ten days of community service for invading the sexual privacy of two former 
intimate partners.  
Other problems plague existing criminal law. Some sexual-privacy 
invasions like up-skirt photos are not covered by criminal statutes; others 
like sextortion are addressed in an inconsistent manner depending upon the 
age of the victims.217 As I argue elsewhere, “[i]nvasions of sexual privacy 
should be addressed in a comprehensive manner.”218 A comprehensive 
approach would include legislation penalizing core invasions of sexual 
privacy with enhanced penalties for bias-motivated privacy invasions.219 
In short, we need to improve both the civil and criminal responses to 
trust-undermining sexual-privacy invasions. There has been sub-optimal 
enforcement in both arenas, and there are crucial gaps in the law. We need 
a liability regime that includes breach of confidence claims and criminal 
laws that address all types of invasions of sexual privacy.  
Yet even with those suggested improvements, law cannot do it all. Law 
is a notoriously blunt instrument. Market efforts provide an important 
supplement to legal solutions. The next Section evaluates some current 
developments.  
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B. Veneer of Trust 
Market efforts claim to address concerns about sexual privacy, but their 
positive potential is less than clear. Consider the emergence of “consent 
apps.” Creators of consent apps argue that the apps will facilitate 
meaningful consent to sexual interactions, including the exchange of nude 
images.220 Prominent recent examples include We-Consent, Consent 
Amour, uConsent, and Yes to Sex.221  
The LegalFling app, for instance, promises to let users “set out which 
practices they are and are not comfortable with.”222 Users can “stipulate 
sexual dos and don’ts as well as rules on the use of condoms, disclosure of 
sexually transmitted diseases, and the taking of photos and videos.”223 The 
app will allow users to assign a penalty if nude footage is shared in violation 
of the agreement.224 Users can change their mind and withdraw consent.225 
For supporters, consent apps can clear up confusion surrounding sexual 
encounters. According to Consent Amour, the app ends “he-said-she-said” 
disputes and “false claims of rape.”226 Consent Amour’s advertising says, 
“false accusations . . . are [made] against innocent guys everyday . . . . That’s 
where Consent Amour comes in. Just a few clicks away, the Consent Amour 
App is there when you need it. . . . When your girl accepts your request, you 
have proof of mutual consent.”227  
Others underscore the perhaps more believable claim that consent apps 
facilitate communication and understanding.228 Yes to Sex founder Wendy 
Mandell Geller hopes the app will “make it easier to talk about sexually 
transmitted diseases, protection, and boundaries.”229 Cody Swann, founder 
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of the uConsent app, says that his software will get people to talk, enhancing 
intimacy.230 He describes the app as forging a “digital handshake.”231 
To be sure, consent apps bring issues of sexual choice to the fore. They 
have potential to encourage discussions about people’s expectations about 
sex and sexual expression, including the taking and distribution of nude 
images. Yet there is no guarantee that meaningful, coercion-free discussions 
are likely to occur. Quite the contrary. As Mary Anne Franks warns, “[i]f 
you can coerce someone into having sex with you, there is nothing to stop 
you from being able to coerce somebody into using an application that 
makes it seem that you consented.”232 Consent apps do very little to dispel 
concerns about coercion. 
Even in the absence of coercion, consent does not operate like an on-off 
switch.233 Consent is contextual and nuanced. If an app memorializes a 
person’s permission that her nude photo can be taken, that does not imply 
consent to the photo’s sharing or distribution. Nor does it necessarily 
capture the person’s withdrawal of consent.  
Consent apps provide a veneer of sexual agency and trust without 
securing either. They imply that sexual interactions are consensual from 
start to finish, but there is no reason to think so. They suggest that a “digital 
handshake” is made with clear eyes, but with no contextual support for that 
inference.  
We should be wary of technical solutions that offer quick fixes to 
difficult questions. The “there is an app for that” response usually 
overpromises and under-delivers. This is especially true when it comes to 
sexual privacy. To be sure, we ought to consider all potential tools to foster 
sexual privacy and trust in intimate relationships. But in considering various 
options including technical ones, we have to ask ourselves whether those 
options in fact enhance sexual privacy and trust rather than undermine them. 
CONCLUSION 
Intimacy has difficulty flourishing without sexual privacy. When 
individuals are treated as sex objects that can be videotaped and exhibited 
rather than as human beings whose sexual privacy should be respected, they 
have difficulty trusting others. Fear undermines the prospect of intimacy. 
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When people are secretly watched and recorded in bedrooms and hotel 
showers, they lose their sense of safety. They become distrustful of others. 
Women and marginalized communities disproportionately shoulder this 
burden.  
Protecting the intimacy-enhancing role of sexual privacy will be 
challenging. Technological solutionism pervades some of our thinking. In 
talks, people have suggested to me that someone should develop an app with 
security in the Blockchain that would protect sexual privacy.234 Unless 
every intimate interaction is recorded for posterity (a terrifying prospect), a 
consent app, for instance, can do little to prevent someone from coercing a 
partner’s consent to the taking and distribution of their nude images. Apps 
can be spoofed, giving the illusion but not the reality of agreement on the 
ground rules for sexual privacy.  
This is not to doubt the possibility of effective market responses, but 
rather to urge skepticism about some recent proposals. Then too, law has an 
important role in the deterrence and redress of invasions of sexual privacy. 
But a careful and modest approach is essential. Society is not better off if 
law overreaches.  
Regrettably, there is no silver bullet solution to intimacy-destroying 
invasions of sexual privacy. We need to think imaginatively about how we 
can protect sexual privacy for the good of individuals, groups, and society. 
This work aims to contribute to thinking about potential legal, technical, and 
social responses to sexual-privacy invasions. A far longer and more 
sustained conversation is required, one that my future work will address.235 
 
234. Popular discourse around privacy and data security invokes Blockchain as a cure-all for many 
contemporary problems. Yet it is surely is not. Thanks to colleagues Ryan Calo, Robert Chesney, Neil 
Richards, Woody Hartzog, and Ari Waldman for always bringing good cheer to the Blockchain refrain. 
235. I am currently at work on a book project entitled Sexual Privacy. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss6/5
